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ABSTRACT 
 
The Bulldog and the Thistle: The Effect of Thatcherism on Nationalist Movements in the 
United Kingdom 
  
 
by 
 
Isabella Christina Gabrovsky 
  
 The purpose of this thesis is to explain the origins of the new wave of nationalism in 
the United Kingdom, particularly in Scotland. The popular narrative has been to blame 
Margaret Thatcher for minority nationalism in the UK as nationalist political parties became 
more popular during and after her tenure as Prime Minister. However, nationalism has 
always existed in some form in every nation of the UK, including England. This thesis asks, 
“How did Margaret Thatcher change nationalism?” because although the late Prime Minister 
is not to blame for the rise of nationalism in the past thirty years, there is a distinct 
correlation between the shift in national identity and political party affiliation, and the tenure 
of her administration.  
 The socio-psychological framework that Ted Robert Gurr created to explain “why 
men rebel,” has been a useful template to explain how nationalist movements can rise in 
multination states. Although the “rebellion” detailed in this thesis was not of the violent type 
for a variety of reasons, there was a revolution in how nationalist movements are executed in 
the United Kingdom, breaking away from nearly five hundred years precedence. It was the 
 vi 
Thatcher administration’s economic policies and the perceived attitude of Thatcher herself 
towards minority nations that fueled a sense of deprivation in the minority nations of the UK, 
and ultimately reinvented how nationalist movements manifest themselves. 
 
 1 
Chapter I: Introduction  
 The purpose of this thesis is to explore the complexities surrounding nationalism in 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and to specifically explain why 
internal nationalist movements and their associated political parties experiences a sudden rise 
in popularity after the 1980s. The current rise of nationalist political parties worldwide 
invites the question: how do these types of political parties gain momentum in states that 
have “winner take all” elections? In the past, “Duverger’s Law” has been shown to work in 
states that employ first-past-the-post  (FPTP) voting methods. Maurice Duverger’s “law” 
states that democratic states that have single-member districts will ultimately become two-
party systems with the two main political parties converging over the center of the political 
spectrum.1 Despite the historic acceptance of his theory as law, it is now being questioned as 
FPTP states are increasingly becoming multiparty. However, the “third” parties in these 
states are more often than not nationalist parties in multinational states.2 Japan, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the UK, and the United States (US) among others, should all exhibit 
two party systems according to Duverger. But the reality is that as of today, only the US 
remains a two-party state.   
 The increase of multiple parties in FPTP states is not necessarily due to Duverger’s 
Law being, according to Patrick Dunleavy, “a dead parrot,”3 but because the states that no 
longer adhere to this law have a correlating trend that may not have been considered: the 
                                                
1 Benoit, Kenneth. “Duverger’s Law and the Study of Electoral Systems.” French Politics. 2006, 4. 
pp 69-83.  
2 Duverger’s Law does not preclude the existence of multiple political parties in FPTP states.  
3 Dunleavy, Patrick. “Duverger’s Law is a dead parrot. Outside the USA, first-past-the-post voting 
has no tendency at all to produce two party politics.” The London School of Economics and Political 
Science: British Politics and Policy, 18 June 2012. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/duvergers-
law-dead-parrot-dunleavy/. Accessed 6 August 2017.  
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increasing popularity of nationalist movements. The UK in particular is an excellent case 
study to see how nationalist movements can shift a FPTP state from having two, relatively 
centrist parties to having a multiparty system. Understanding the rise and trajectory of 
nationalist political parties in the UK will not only serve as a template to understand this 
trend worldwide, but also will serve as a general guideline to help understand the change in 
status quo and possibly better predict FPTP elections in this day and age. 
 I first seek to disprove the popular narrative that there exists a communal sense of a 
pan-British national identity uniting the minority nations in the UK which has succeeded in 
superseding any other national identity. I also aim to show that minority Celtic nationalism 
has always existed in the UK, and that even at the height of the British Empire, there were 
still popular movements resisting Westminster rule from within the UK. Nationalist 
movements develop and mature over time, yet the movements in the UK changed course 
rapidly in the last two decades of the 20th century. Using Scotland as a representative case 
study, this thesis seeks to illuminate the change from the traditional ethnocentric nationalism  
to the modern civic nationalism that is prominent in Scotland today. Nationalist political 
parties went from single-issue fringe political groups with no representation, to mainstream 
political powerhouses that dominate the politics of their respective nations. My hypothesis is 
that this sudden shift in narrative is to a large degree the result of the collective memory 
regarding the late Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the policies associated 
with her administration, known as “Thatcherism.” 
 By beginning with a brief history of nationalism in each nation of the UK, I aim to 
provide context for the nationalist movements and political parties we see in mainstream 
British politics. This is important in establishing the collective memory of minority nations 
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regarding their place within the UK, but also to illustrate the patterns of nationalist 
movements. While each nation has a unique set of circumstances by which it joined the 
union, none are truly unique in their response. An unintended result of minority nationalism 
diverging from the traditional path, is the increase in English nationalism.  
 British national identity is relatively modern as a nationality, gaining traction with the 
rise of the British Empire under Queen Victoria. However, this “Britishness” was adopted by 
the aristocracy in lieu of “Englishness,” and not necessarily by the common people of the 
various nationalities of the UK. In each of the minority nations of the UK—the Irish, the 
Welsh, the Cornish, and the Scottish—there were battles for independence and cultural 
movements, but none were able to make it into mainstream politics. As will be discussed in 
later chapters, this situation changed demonstrably after Thatcher.  
 Margaret Thatcher’s policies of neoliberalism (1979-1990) were despised by a 
majority of Scottish voters. The fiscal policies of her administration (and in some cases, her 
attitudes towards nationalism and minority nations in the UK) have been credited with giving 
rise to the devolution movement in the UK, which established a Welsh assembly and 
reinstated the Scottish Parliament in 1999. Although it was actually under Tony Blair’s 
administration (1997-2007) that devolution occurred, it was indeed the adverse reaction to 
Thatcher in Scotland that renewed the case for Scottish autonomy, thus allowing Blair’s 
administration to build upon it as a legacy.  
 I will compare the results of Thatcher’s tenure with the changes in national identity, 
which suggests that the rise in regional identity affiliation was in reaction to Thatcherism. 
The nationalist parties of the minority nations, particularly in Scotland, created platforms 
around the position of being “anti-Thatcher.” Thus, these nationalists parties advertise 
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themselves as leftist and socialist. In reaction to the reactionary Celtic nationalists, the 
English nationalist groups have firmly planted their political ideologies to the right. 
 The UK has multiple nations, and overlapping national identities, both ethnic and 
civic. Moreover, each nation has a particular constitutional status. The complexities 
surrounding nationalism in a multi-national state with a rising immigrant population have 
made the task of deconstructing nationalist politics somewhat daunting. Before delving in, it 
will be helpful first to provide a list of definitions for relevant terms that not only lack 
concrete universal definitions, but that are also often incorrectly used interchangeably, so that 
the reader may better understand the nature of nationalism in the UK. I will also provide a 
brief section explaining the political geography of the UK.  
 
Glossary of Relevant Terms 
 The differences between a country, a nation, and state have become increasingly 
difficult to distinguish in the UK.  
-   A nation is a group of people with a shared sense of history and/or destiny.4 The people 
can feel united by ethnicity, religion, or residence, but are certainly not limited to any one 
or all of these traits. Nations can belong to state or a country, but can also be “stateless” or 
transient, such as the  Jewish people pre-1948, the Roma, or the British and Irish 
Travellers.5 
  Nations can split into smaller nations, but still have ties with the original group. The 
Irish, for example, can be seen as one nation that includes the diaspora in America, Canada, 
                                                
4 See Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. Verso. 2016.  
5 The Roma and Travellers are both commonly referred to as “Gypsies,” but are in fact of different 
ethnic descent.  
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and Great Britain, as well as the Irish in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland. This 
is a meta-nation, composed of those who are of Irish descent who no longer live in Ireland, 
yet still feel connected to the nation, as well as those who live and work in Ireland regardless 
of ethnic heritage. Ireland as a nation is split further still, as those who live on either side of 
the border between the Republic and the UK now share different experiences from one 
another, despite sharing the same land mass.  There is a meta-nation, but also a variety of 
sub-nations that constitute “the Irish nation.” 
The terms “country” and “state” are more often than not used interchangeably, but in 
certain cases, such as the British Isles, it would be a fallacy to treat these two terms as 
synonymous.  
-   A country is a territory with at least one national group in residence, but does not 
necessarily have sovereignty. Although it is part of the UK, Scotland can be considered a 
country because it has a recognized territory. Ireland is a country split between two states, 
the Republic of Ireland and the UK. It should be noted that there is also a difference 
between a province and a region. A province has specific territorial boundaries, such as 
the state of California in the United States. A region would be a distinct area of a state, 
country, or province, and has relatively fluid boundaries. For example, southern California 
is a region of California. 
-   A state is a political entity, a community of sorts organized under one central government. 
A state can be multinational like the United Kingdom, or a homogenous nation-state, such 
as Iceland. However, it should be pointed out that the ideal of a nation-state is somewhat 
of a myth. National identity used to be (and still is colloquially) synonymous with 
ethnicity, but if that were truly the case, no state would be a nation-state due to 
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immigration and annexation. France is often used as an example of a nation state, but there 
are many different ethnic groups within its borders (e.g. Basques, Bretons, and 
Marseillaise) and even a recent President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, was of Hungarian 
descent.  
The differences between nation, country, and state can be very nuanced and for most 
cases would go unnoticed. A helpful way to distinguish the differences in these terms 
in the UK is by sports teams. For the Olympics, teams are divided by states. The UK 
competes as a team, as does the Republic of Ireland. For the FIFA World Cup, each 
nation has team that competes—Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, England, and the 
Republic of Ireland each have their own soccer team. For the Rugby World Cup, 
teams are designated by country. For example, England and Scotland each get their 
own team, and the Irish team is comprised of players from both the Republic and 
Northern Ireland, as one country.  
-   Nationalism should be defined as the pride one feels toward one’s nation, or as national 
consciousness. Nationalism is sometimes used interchangeably with patriotism, which 
should be distinguished as the pride or collective consciousness one feels for his or her 
country or state. The differences between the two can get muddled when a state develops a 
national consciousness. However, for the purposes of this these, nationalism will be in 
reference to nations, and patriotism will be in reference to states and countries.  
 
Political Geography  
 A brief introduction to the political and geographical landscape of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland clarifying the differences between Great 
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Britain, the United Kingdom, and all the countries within the Union is necessary to 
understand the complexities of national identity within this state. Although the UK has 
territories and protectorates, as well as a Commonwealth, I will not further complicate an 
already complex situation and will thus focus on the state as a political territorial unit. That 
is, I will be discussing the UK as a sovereign state. Citizens of the UK are referred to as 
British, which also leads to confusion in understanding the difference between Britain, Great 
Britain, and the United Kingdom. 
 It is commonplace to use Britain, the UK, and Great Britain interchangeably, but it is 
technically incorrect to do so, and certainly causes confusion. The British Isles is a 
geographical name, rather than a political designation, which refers to the islands in the 
northwest of Europe. Great Britain and Ireland are the two largest islands of the British Isles, 
Great Britain being the larger of the two. However, these two islands are also split between 
two sovereign states. 
 Great Britain hosts multiple indigenous ethnic groups and nationalities. Some of these 
groups are transitory, such as the Romanichal Gypsies, also known as Travellers, but there 
are also nationalities and ethnic groups in Great Britain that are indigenous to a specific 
territory. These territories with specific ethnic groups are considered to be countries within 
the UK. Some have a degree of autonomy, although none are sovereign from the UK as a 
state. The countries within Great Britain are England, Scotland, Wales, and Cornwall.   
 The “United Kingdom” is the union between Scotland and England, having joined 
crowns in 1603. England had incorporated Wales and Cornwall as provinces by 1543. When 
King James VI of Scotland inherited the English throne via his aunt, Queen Elizabeth I, the 
two kingdoms of Scotland and England united the entire island of Great Britain, thus “The 
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United Kingdom of Great Britain.” Scotland has different customs and languages (Scots and 
Gaelic) that separate it from the rest of the United Kingdom, but it also has maintained a 
distinct legal system, currency, and education system. 
 Wales, too, has a separate culture and language from the rest of England, but due to a 
difference in constitutional status, that of being a province of England, it was politically 
indistinguishable from England until the Acts of Devolution in the late 1990s. Although the 
people of Cornwall also boast a difference culture, language, and ethnicity, they are still 
considered to be a region of England, and have no separate constitutional status in the way 
that Scotland and Wales do. 
 Ireland was not a unitary state before being colonized by the UK, but became a “full 
member” of the state after the Act of Union in 1801. Thus, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain became the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. After nearly 300 years of 
violent rebellion, the political union between Ireland and Great Britain was finally negotiated 
in 1800. The UK would retain six counties in the north of Ireland as part of the union, hence 
the official state name: the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the 
rest of the island would become the Irish Free State. In 1949, the Dáil (the Irish legislature) 
passed the Republic of Ireland Act which would not only rebrand the Irish Free State as a 
republic, thus removing any British authority within its borders, but it also withdrew Ireland 
from the Commonwealth.  
 The lack of a written constitution in the UK and the ever changing status of the 
degrees of autonomy of the nations within its borders allows for ambiguity. It is more often 
than not that tourists and visiting celebrities will mistake Scotland for part of England, or 
assume that Ireland is still part of the UK, but these are also common mistakes made by 
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Britons themselves. Although all Cornish, Welsh, Scottish, and English are equally British, 
there are still headlines such as “British people announce wish to move to Scotland after 
Theresa May commits UK to leaving EU Single Market,”6 indicating that there are still some 
unaware that Scots too are British. Although the minority nations may no longer feel British, 
as will be discussed later in this thesis, they are still, legally, British.  
 
 
 
                                                
6 Osbourne, Samuel. “British people announce wish to move to Scotland after Theresa May commits 
UK to leaving EU Single Market.” The Independent. 17 January 2017.  
 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/british-people-move-scotland-theresa-may-brexit-
speech-leave-eu-single-market-european-union-a7531921.html 
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Figure 1. Source: Tong, Vivian. Nations of Great Britain and Ireland. JPEG file. 
Aug. 2017. 
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Chapter II: Historical Context 
 The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the various nationalist movements and 
national identities that exist within the United Kingdom and to deconstruct the generally 
accepted arguments that there is such a thing as a cohesive and standard British identity and 
nationalism, and that this “Britishness,” united by Empire and Protestantism, is stronger than 
fringe nationalism. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that, in reality, such a notion is merely 
a cultural myth. The intention of providing a brief discussion of the history of each 
nationalist movement in the UK is not to suffice for a detailed history of each nation, but 
rather to illustrate the narrative of minority nations in Britain by highlighting the moments in 
time that have shaped the collective narrative. These highlighted moments are but a few in a 
much larger history, and the majority of the pre-modern movements discussed here were only 
considered “nationalist” by later generations, as a result of the contemporary nationalists 
appropriating pieces of history to serve nationalist goals and thus reshape collective memory.  
 It is the ultimate aim of this thesis to show that while nationalism and nationalist 
political movements have always existed in the UK, it was only after Margaret Thatcher’s 
administration from 1979-1990 that nationalist political parties, particularly in England and 
Scotland gained momentum, and diverged from traditional positions and avenues. The 
nations and their nationalists movements to be discussed in the following sections are 
Cornwall, Wales, Ireland and Northern Ireland, Scotland, and England and “Britain.”  
a. Cornwall 
 The smallest of the minority nations in the United Kingdom, Cornwall, is the lower-
most peninsula that juts out from England, just below Wales. Although Cornwall boasts its 
own unique language and traditions, it was only in 2014 that the Cornish were recognized as 
 12 
a distinct national identity separate from the English. That April, the UK government granted 
“Minority Status” for the Cornish, an action required by the Council of Europe’s 1998 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. It should be noted that this 
long-awaited national recognition was decreed only a few short months before Scotland’s 
Independence Referendum in September, perhaps as a measure to pacify Cornish 
nationalists.  
 Although Cornwall is generally considered to be a province of England, and 
“absorbed into the mainstream of English life,”7 the process of incorporation that the Cornish 
experienced actually grants Cornwall a special constitutional status. Cornwall is technically a 
Duchy, an inheritable property to be held by the heir to the throne, the Prince of Wales 
(currently Prince Charles). But there also remains the fact that, having originally been a 
separate country, Cornwall was never formally annexed as a county of England, nor 
acknowledged in the Acts of Union which would have made it a member nation of Great 
Britain. In fact, one of the few written laws regarding Cornwall’s legal status, which dates 
back to Henry VIII, is the 1508 Charter of Pardon which establishes a separate “Stannary 
Parliament” for Cornwall.  
 Although this parliament of sorts last met in 1753, it was “revived” by Cornish 
nationalists in the late 1970s who argued that since the Charter of Pardon was still in the 
statute books, a separate Cornish parliament was still legally valid.8 However, in 2007, 
Bridget Prentice, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, answered a question from 
Andrew George MP regarding Cornish autonomy by affirming that “Cornwall has always 
                                                
7 Rowse, A. L. Tudor Cornwall. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969. Print. 
8 The Revived Cornish Stannary Parliament’s arguments and manifesto can be found on their website, 
www.cornishstannaryparliament.co.uk.  
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been an integral part of the Union. There are no treaties today that apply to Cornwall 
only. …There is no special status for legislation which applies to Cornwall or to Cornish 
localities.”9  
 The “ordinary Cornish people” felt that they had “been granted a unique 
constitutional status to reflect their unique cultural identity.”10 It was, in fact, their strong 
belief in a unique identity that led to rebellions in 1497 and 1549 against English rule. The 
first rebellion was against Henry VIII raising taxes in order to wage war on a still 
independent Scotland, a country that posed no threat to Cornwall’s border.11 The rebellion in 
1549 appears to be more than the typical Catholic region rebelling against a Protestant King, 
as the predominantly Catholic Cornish never expressly rebelled against Protestantism. 
Edward VI declared that a new English-language Common Book of Prayer must replace the 
traditional Latin mass, and this incited rebellion amongst the Cornish who had previously 
been allowed as Catholics to worship in Cornish12 and thus perceived this as a threat to their 
unique language and traditions, as well as their relative autonomy. At least three thousand 
Cornish were killed, and a lasting result was that “the ruling classes may well have come to 
associate the Cornish tongue with rebellion and sedition…poverty and ‘backwardness.’”13 
Still, when surveying Cornwall for a book published in 1602, Richard Carew noted that if an 
English-speaking person was to ask for directions, they would be met with the answer “Meea 
navidna cowzasawzneck, I can speak no Saxonage.”14 
                                                
9 Parliamentary Records: Daily Hansard-Written Answers 29 March 2007, Column 1671 W.  
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070329/text/70329w0004.htm 
10 Stoyle, Mark. “The Cornish: A Neglected Nation?” BBC. 2011.  
11 The taxation misstep will be further explored as a pattern in a later chapter of this Thesis.  
12 Stoyle, Mark. Ibid. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Carew, Richard. The Survey of Cornwall. eds 1769. 56 
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 Today, Cornwall is not even recognized as a separate region, let alone as a country, 
and perhaps as a consequence there is growing support for a separate Cornish Assembly, 
such as the assemblies granted to Wales and Northern Ireland, as a result of the Act of 
Devolution in 1998. In 2001, a petition for Cornish devolved powers with 50,000 
signatures—roughly 10% of the population of Cornwall— was submitted to then Prime 
Minister Tony Blair. Since then, Cornwall has made small steps towards greater autonomy. 
In 2009, a unitary council was made for Cornwall, giving it authority over decisions 
regarding roads, schools, and other local issues. Although Mr Blair at the time claimed that 
there was little public support for Cornish devolution, polls taken in 2014 by the University 
of Exeter and Pirate FM (a Cornish ratio station) both indicated that over 60% of Cornish 
people favor greater powers for Cornwall.  
 The Cornish language has experienced a revival since its near extinction, with schools 
offering courses as a result of funding from the EU and UK governments in accordance with 
EU acts that legislate the protection of the languages and cultures of minority nations. In the 
last UK census, eight out of ten people in the western districts of Cornwall listed Cornish as 
their primary language. For the first time, in 2011 the UK Census listed “Cornish” as a 
national identity. However, since Cornwall has only recently been considered as separate 
from England, there are very few statistics regarding national identity versus ethnic identity 
by location. There has been a small rise in reported violent incidents between Cornish 
nationalists and English residents. However, it is unclear whether these attacks are a new 
trend or only recently being recognized as the work of nationalist groups.  These attacks are 
quite mild in comparison to the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland, and thus have been relatively 
ignored by the UK media. The Cornish militant group An Gof has been known to place 
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broken glass under a layer of sand on the Cornish beaches to “deter tourists,” and vandalize 
English flags found in gardens.15 In July 2017, An Gof changed its name to the Cornish 
Republican Army and released a new manifesto online claiming to have a potential suicide 
bomber within their ranks and vowing to “prevent the ethnic cleansing of the people of 
Kernow (Cornwall).”16 In the statement, the group took responsibility for firebombing an 
English-owned restaurant in Cornwall.  
 
b. Wales 
 Welsh identity and nationalist movements have waxed and waned over the centuries 
and have been complicated by the ambiguous status of Wales within the United Kingdom, or 
rather, within England. Wales was originally a conglomeration of principalities, uniting on 
occasion to fight the Danes, the Irish, and eventually what would become the English.17 
Wales was united under one prince, Llewelyn the Great, in 1228. The last sovereign prince of 
an independent Wales was his grandson, Llewelyn the Last, in 1240. After a series of battles 
and rebellions, Edward I of England had fully subdued Wales by 1294. Although Wales was 
                                                
15 “Condemnation for 'An Gof' vandalism.” The Packet (Falmouth). Web. 25 April 2007.  
 http://www.falmouthpacket.co.uk/news/1352958.condemnation_for_an_gof_vandalism/ 
 
It should be taken into account that these nationalist Cornish groups had particular issue with displays 
of English flags in Cornwall, not the Union Jack. The Union Jack is the official flag for the UK, an 
overlapping of the Scottish saltire of St. Andrew’s Cross, the Cross of the St Patrick repenting Ireland 
(now just Northern Ireland) the English flag of St George’s Cross. The Cornish have their own flag, 
black with a white cross, known as St Piran’s Cross.  
16 Jackson, Russell. “Militant Cornish nationalists claim to have suicide bomber ready.” The Scotsman 
(Edinburgh). 10 July 2017.  
http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/militant-cornish-nationalists-claim-to-have-suicide-bomber-
ready-1-4499485 
17 “England” as we know it was still being formed by Anglo-Saxon and Norman forces fighting one 
another.  
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no longer autonomous, it remained a distinct principality as a dominion of the Kingdom of 
England.  
 However, in 1400 there was a nationalist uprising which would have ramifications for 
Welsh nationalism and identity for centuries. Owen Glyndŵr was the last native ethnic 
Welshman to hold the title “Prince of Wales.”18 In 1400, Glyndŵr repossessed disputed lands 
after confrontations with King Henry IV and Lord Grey. Battles such as this over land or 
resources within Britain would not have been unusual for the time, but Glyndŵr is, 
nonetheless, recognized as the “father of Welsh nationalism” because, from 1400-1415, he 
launched a rebellion uniting all the Welsh against the English, thus creating a cohesive and 
distinct national identity. The Welsh Penal Laws19 were introduced in 1402 and in addition to 
banning public assembly, stipulated that Welshmen could neither own castles, armor, or 
weapons, nor be employed as bards, musicians, justices, sheriffs, among a host of other 
limitations. These retaliatory laws even extended to Englishmen married to Welsh women.20  
 The Penal Laws against Wales were eventually repealed in 1624, under King James 
I.21  In the meanwhile, Wales lost its status as a principality by being annexed and 
incorporated into the Kingdom of England under the Laws in Wales Acts of 1535 and 1542, 
                                                
18 Interestingly enough, when Prince William, currently the Duke of Cambridge, inherits the throne, 
his son, Prince George, will be the first Prince of Wales having Welsh ancestry (through his mother) 
since the last of the Tudor Dynasty.   
19 These laws were passed as three separate acts: the Wales Act, the Wales and Welshmen Act, and 
the Welshman Act.  
20 The National Archives Website: Discovery: Uniting the Kingdoms, 1066-1603. Penal Laws 
Applied to the Welsh in 1402. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/utk/wales/popup/penal_trans.htm 
(accessed 20 June 2017).  
21 King James I of England was originally King James VI of Scotland, but took the title “I of 
England” after England and Scotland joined crowns in 1603.   
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now also known as The Act of Union.22 Constitutionally, England and Wales were now 
indistinguishable by status, and yet the inhabitants of the two nations were separated by class, 
wealth, language, and religion.  
 The Welsh have a long tradition of storytelling through epics, songs, and poems. The 
most prominent of these tales is the Mabinogion, in which readers are introduced to King 
Arthur.23 These stories passed on through the years have remarkable nationalist tones when 
describing Welsh princes and princesses, and the battles with Ireland. Ernest Renan (known 
for his seminal lecture at the Sorbonne in 1882, “What is a Nation?”) writes of the 
Mabinogion and of the person to first translate the remaining manuscripts into English, Lady 
Charlotte Guest, in “Poetry of the Celtic Races” (1896) “…the Mabinogion, the peal of 
Gaelic literature, the completest expression of the Cymric genius. This magnificent 
work…will one day attest how full of life the consciousness of the Celtic races remained in 
the present century. Only indeed the sincerest patriotism24 could inspire a woman to 
undertake and achieve so vast a literary monument.”25  
Renan notes that despite the Arthurian legends being so pervasive in Western European 
culture, the source of these tales was unknown: “The cause is doubtless to be ascribed to the 
                                                
22 It should be noted that, “The Act of Union” can refer to these Laws in Wales Acts, but also to the 
Acts of Union in 1707 and 1800 for Scotland and Ireland, respectively.  
23 King Arthur is from Cornwall in these versions, but that does not stop the Welsh from claiming him 
as some form of national “Messiah” who will rise once again. See Henken, Elissa R. “Three Forms of 
a Hero: Arthur, Owain Lawgoch, and Owain Glyndŵr.” Proceedings of the Harvard Celtic 
Colloquium, Vol. 15 (1995), pp. 22-31 
24 An interesting point to make would be that Lady Guest was actually an English aristocrat from 
Lincolnshire, married to a Welsh MP, John Josiah Guest. It can be assumed that she learned Welsh 
from her husband, and that she showed nationalism in the more modern sense, free from primordial 
ethnic claims. Barczewski (footnote 22) suggests that Guest’s English identity may have framed the 
Mabinogion not as tales of Welsh independence and nation-hood, but as something more palatable to 
Victorian English readers.  
25 Renan, Ernest. Poetry of the Celtic Races, and Other Studies by Ernest Renan. Trans. William G. 
Hutchison. London: Walter Scott, 1896. Print. pp 3-4.  
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dispersed state of the Welsh manuscripts, pursued till the last century by the English, as 
seditious books compromising those who possessed them.”26 He is most likely referring to 
the Penal Code of 1402. As a manual for nationalist sentiments, Stephanie Barczewski writes 
“the Mabinogion belongs to that mode of nineteenth century Welsh nationalism which tried 
to create a mythical and romantic national past, a past that could serve as a source of pride 
but at the same time made Wales appear archaic and quaint.”27  
 Despite the acts of 1535 and 1542, Wales suffered from the original penalties from 
1402. Save for a few Welshmen such as Lady Guest’s first husband, the vast majority of 
Welsh were subsisting at poverty levels as farmers, iron workers, and coal miners. The 
Welsh uprisings from the late 1700s through the first World War were not overtly nationalist 
in the sense that very few were rebelling for Welsh independence. These were class 
uprisings, and the Welsh became a nation renewed again, defined by social status and wealth 
and made distinct by language and religion.28 
There are few official records before the 1891 census indicating the strength of the Welsh 
language, but despite the schools being “English Only,” around 30% of Welsh claimed to be 
monoglots.29 
 Movements such as the Rebecca Riots, where farmers would dress as women and act 
out a skit before destroying tolls set up by English landlords, and the secretive Scotch Cattle 
                                                
26 Ibid. pp 11 
27 Barczewski, Stephanie. “Myth and National Identity in Nineteenth Century Britain: The Legends of 
King Arthur and Robin Hood.” New York: Oxford University Press. Print. 2000. pp 121.  
 
To clarify, Barczewski refers to the translation of the Mabinogi as being 19th century, not the tales 
themselves which were first compiled from the oral tradition in the 11th century.  
28 Crowley, Mark J. "Wales, Nationalist Protest, 19th Century." International Encyclopedia of 
Revolution and Protest. Ed. Immanuel Ness. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 3497-501. Print. 
29 1891 Census, accessed from https://www.ukcensusonline.com/census/1891.php. 
 19 
group that acted as relatively non-violent vigilantes for fair business practices and workers 
rights, and the Tonypandy riots of 1910, set the stage for the Miners’ Strike in 1984. The 
Miners’ Strike ultimately helped shape Celtic nationalism during the 1980s and 1990s as a 
legitimate political force that would eventually lead to devolution in 1997. 
 Welsh nationalism is inextricably tied to socialism; Keir Hardie, an MP from Wales 
(1900-1915), commented on Welsh nationalist movements, “Like all Celts, they are socialists 
by instinct.”30 BBC History writes that Wales “could convincingly be described as the 
world's first proletarian nation.”31There were some Welsh that advocated for Home Rule, 
inspired by the Irish nationalists, and as the majority of Welsh were working class it has been 
easy to conflate the class struggles with Welsh nationalism.32 However, the common thread 
amongst all the movements was that there were no demands for independence (as was the 
case with both Scotland and Ireland) and the main concern was that the Welsh language and 
culture were being overcome by English immigrants to Wales and by the Westminster 
governments. Welsh in schools was required to be taught in English, if at all. Westminster 
politicians were quoted as saying that ‘there was no such place as Wales,’ and editions of 
Encyclopaedia Brittanica had the directive “For Wales—see England.”33  
 In 1865, just over 150 Welsh settled in Argentina orchestrated by the Rev. Michael D. 
Jones, “as a means of preserving the Welsh cultural community free from English 
                                                
30 Labour Leader, 9 July 1898. 
31 “Industrialisation in 19th Century Wales.” BBC History. Web. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/industrialisation_19th_century_wales. Accessed 30 June 2017.  
32 Case in point, a Welshman, Robert Owen, is considered by many to be the “founder of the Socialist 
movement.” Ironically, Friedrich Engels is quoted as saying “English socialism arose with Owen.” 
See: Breverton, Terry. Immortal Words. London: Quercus Publishing Plc, 2009. p 173.  
33 Morgan, Kenneth O. “Welsh Nationalism: The Historical Background.” Journal of Contemporary 
History, vol. 6, no. 1, 1971, pp. 153–172. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/259629. 
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contamination.”34 Plaid Cymru, or the Party for Wales, established in 1925 has never 
advocated for Welsh independence, but rather for a return to dominion status.35 Welsh 
nationalism has never been about establishing a nation-state, but about establishing cultural 
autonomy from English hegemony.36 Efforts to preserve the Welsh language have been met 
with some resentment by English visitors. A recent example was a Welsh restauranteur 
interviewed by a newspaper in 2017, politely complaining that “A minority of English people 
do seem to be quite ignorant of the fact that people speak Welsh as their first language…we 
don’t speak it to make English people feel isolated.”37  
 In 1974, the Labour Party produced a Welsh manifesto that committed itself to 
establish an elected Welsh assembly, despite Labour’s continued opposition to Scottish 
devolution.38  Calls for a referendum on devolution for both Wales and Scotland persisted 
despite an upcoming General Election in 1979 and an unlikely coalition of Labour and Plaid 
Cymru. The referendum failed for many reasons including infighting and lack of enthusiasm 
and commitment from London, but also due to an ad-hoc restriction requiring a majority 
voter turnout in order for the vote to be valid.  
 The 1979 referendum was essentially set up for failure,39 but the anticlimactic defeat 
did not quell Welsh support for autonomy. In 1997, Prime Minister Tony Blair planned for a 
                                                
34 Ibid, p 165. See also Baskerville, Eirionedd A. “Companion to the Welsh Settlement in Patagonia.” 
2014. http://www.cymru-
ariannin.com/uploads/companion_to_the_welsh_settlement_in_patagonia.pdf 
35 Ibid, p 169.  
36 "It Is Unusual; Welsh Politics." The Economist (US) 21 Mar. 2015. 
 http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21646769-why-wales-different-scotland-it-unusual 
37 Jones, Mari. “Anti-Welsh Language Complainst at Restaurant ‘on Daily Basis.’” Daily Post. 27 
June 2017.  
38 Wyn Jones, Richard, and Roger Scully. Wales Says Yes: Devolution and the 2011 Welsh 
Referendum. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2012. Print. pp 8-9. 
39 Ibid. pp 7-14.  
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referendum on Scottish devolution, effectively reversing his party’s policy on the matter and 
the Act of Union of 1707. He was urged and eventually convinced by his Secretary of State 
for Wales, Ron Davies, to include a Welsh referendum for executive devolution.40 The Welsh 
vote took place one week after the Scottish vote, and both passed. Currently, Wales has an 
Assembly, which increased its authority to govern on a number of issues after another 
referendum in 2011. Again, this was by no means the culmination of Welsh nationalist 
movements. Later that year, the leader of Plaid Cymru, Leanne Wood, successfully 
campaigned for Wales to be recognized as a country (rather than a territory or, incorrectly, as 
a principality) by the International Standards Organization.41  
 Welsh nationalist movements have progressed with punctuated equilibrium, and in a 
direction that was anything but linear—but that does not invalidate it as a force to be 
reckoned with. Wales, previously seen, for the obvious reasons, as “Labour country,” voted 
for Brexit by nearly 53-47. However, the vote for leaving the European Union was not out of 
a sense of British nationalism. After all, in Wales “it was more common to see xenophobia 
directed towards the English-born population…than migrants from further afield.”42 The 
Welsh enjoy generous funding from the EU as compared to what they receive from 
                                                
40 This allows for Wales to have an assembly as opposed to Scottish legislative Devolution, which 
reinstated the Scottish Parliament that had been dissolved in 1707.  
41 “International body grants Wales country status after principality error.” Wales Online. 1 August 
2011. Web. http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/international-body-grants-wales-
country-1813629 
42 O’Hagan, Ellie Mae. “Wales Voted for Brexit Because it has Been Ignored by Westminster for Too 
Long.” The Independent. London. 25 June 2016.   http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-wales-
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Westminster. It is not that the Welsh have “developed Stockholm syndrome,”43 but because 
as a nation the Welsh will always vote for more autonomy and voice.  
c. Ireland and Northern Ireland 
 According to  the “British” national narrative, the secession of Ireland from the Union 
was a battle between poor Catholics and rich Protestants. If only it were so simple. The 
Normans invaded Ireland in 1169, then a conglomeration of kingdoms, and in 1171, Ireland 
became a papal possession with King Henry II proclaiming himself Lord of Ireland. Ireland 
remained part of a limited sphere of influence, and it was decades after King Henry VIII had 
proclaimed himself King of Ireland in 1541,44 that during the reign of  Elizabeth I, the 
English began to effectively colonize Ireland. With the coronation of James I, the Crowns of 
England, Scotland, and Ireland were joined. In 1609, the Crown sent English and Scottish 
settlers to seize lands from the Irish in the Ulster province (now Northern Ireland) as this area 
in particular had been resistant to British rule. The rebellions continued and culminated in the 
Confederate Wars from 1641-1653. Oliver Cromwell led a brutal invasion of Ireland in 1652, 
violently removing land from Catholic possession and bestowing it upon his Protestant 
followers.  
 One of the first large-scale nationalist movements against British rule was in 1798, 
led by a protestant, Theobald Wolfe Tone, now seen as the “father” of Irish nationalism. As a 
result of this particular Protestant uprising, in 1800 there was an Act of Union that 
supposedly gave Irish equal rights as citizens. However, many of the penal laws that had 
                                                
43 Cosslett, Rhiannon Lucy. “I’ve Been a Closet Welsh Nationalist—But it’s Time I Came Out.” The 
Guardian.  London. 26 September 2014.  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/26/welsh-nationalist-wales-independence 
44 Colley, Linda. Acts of Union and Disunion. London: Profile Books LTD, 2014. Print. p 97 
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been institutions of English rule in Ireland were still de facto law. In 1829, Catholics were 
finally “emancipated” in the UK.  
 Historian Linda Colley writes that the Irish were “integral actors in the (British) 
empire,” citing how the Irish made up the majority of the British army in 1830, and that over 
800,000 Irish were living in Great Britain by 1881 because the “empire’s multiple 
opportunities helped to render the Union more palatable.”45 Unfortunately, there is no real 
evidence that the union was made more palatable. The Irish simply had no choice because 
they were literally starving to death and lacked the civil rights for social mobility. One need 
look no further than the Irish famine to explain why Irish men would join the British army, 
an employer that distributed regular meals, and why Irish families would emigrate to Great 
Britain. The famine lasted roughly from 1845 to 1855, but the effects of the failing potato 
crops were exacerbated by British laws such as the Poor Law Act 1838 and the repeal of the 
Corn Laws in 1846,46 as starving Irish were forced off lands and their other crops, such as 
corn, grain, and dairy were exported to Great Britain.47 Colley creates a rather naive 
                                                
45 Ibid. p 99 
46 The repeal of the Corn Laws were supposedly intended as a relief measure for the Irish during the 
Famine, but there is significant evidence that the repeal would have been enacted regardless, and that 
the famine merely helped speed the repeal process. See: Christine Kinealy, cited below. Irish scholars 
such as John Mitchel (History of Ireland, 1868) condemned the English for forcing Irish farmers to 
export crops during a famine, and that the repeal of the Corn Laws helped the English economy while 
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or Creation of England?” (Michigan Journal of Economics, Vol 3, Issue 2, April 1981. pp 46-56) that 
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grain being imported into the UK as a result of the repeal lowered the prices of grain. Grain and oats 
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47 Kinealy, Christine. "Was Ireland a Colony? The Evidence of the Great Famine." Was Ireland a 
Colony?: Economics, Politics, and Culture in Nineteenth-century Ireland. Ed. by Terrence 
McDonough. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2005. 48-65. Print. 
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narrative, presenting the supposed integration of the Irish into the UK as occurring despite 
the famine and lack of civil rights. The reality is much darker. 
 A British newspaper, The Times, wrote in 1848 that the Irish people “have always 
been listless, improvident, and wretched, under whatever rulers…They have not participated 
in the great progress of mankind…We do pity them, because they have yet to be civilised.”48 
Should there be any doubt as to whether the famine was employed as a tool for ethnic 
cleansing49, the Census Commissioners in 1856 commented on the loss of nearly two million 
people in Ireland as “on the whole, satisfactory, demonstrating as they do the general 
advancement of the country.”50 
 In direct conflict with Colley’s rosy view of the state of the Union,  the Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland, the Earl of Clarendon, wrote in 1849 of British neglect in Ireland as 
amounting to “a policy of extermination.”51 Articles in various papers wrote that “the 
Celts…will not work if they can exist without it,”52 and “The famine—if there be a famine—
is man made.”53 Despite those within the UK doubting the validity of the famine or the 
helplessness of its victims, two stories in particular stand out in Irish collective memory.  
 The first, is that of the aid received from the American Indian Choctaw tribe, which 
having experienced the Trail of Tears a mere six years prior raised a sum of $170 in 1847 to 
                                                
48 The Times. 4 October 1848. Taken from Kinealy, Christine. “Was Ireland a Colony? The Evidence 
of the Great Famine.” Was Ireland a Colony? Edited by Terrence McDonough. Irish Academic Press. 
2005. p 50.  
49 Coogan, Tim Pat. The Famine Plot: England’s Role in Ireland’s Greatest Tragedy. Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2012. Print. 
50 General Report of Census Commissioners for Ireland. (Dublin, 1856), p. lviii.  
51 Christine Kinealy. "Was Ireland a Colony? The Evidence of the Great Famine." Was Ireland a 
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52 Ibid. p 61 
53 Ibid. p 56 
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give to the Irish people. This tale in particular is well documented, and a delegation from the 
Choctaw tribe visited Cork in 2017 to witness the unveiling of a statue in honor of the 
original donors, entitled “Kindred Spirits.”54  
 The second tale recalls the efforts of Khaleefah Abdul-Majid I, Sultan of the Ottoman 
Empire, who offered 10,000 pounds to “help ease the suffering.”55 The Sultan was asked by 
Queen Victoria to reduce his offer to 1,000 pounds, so as to not contribute more than her own 
donation of 2,000 pounds. After reluctantly agreeing, he secretly sent ships full of food and 
aid to Dublin, and although the ships were met with a British blockade, they eventually 
docked in Drogheda and delivered the food to the starving residents there.56  
 Collective memory in Ireland regarding stories like these is important, because it 
accentuates the national identity of the Irish as separate from the British. There was a similar 
potato blight in Scotland in 1846, but the effects were mitigated due to British aid and the 
ability of wealthy Scottish farmers to suspend exports in order to feed their own. The Irish 
Famine, according to Robert Kee, showed that “the important divisions in Irish society were 
no longer those of race or religion, but those of class.”57 In writing about the British 
perception of the Irish, Michael de Nie demonstrates in his book, The Eternal Paddy, that the 
Irish identity was at odds with the British in almost all facets— that being race, religion, and 
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class. The stereotyped Irishman, “the Paddy,” was in “British eyes…forever a Celt, a 
Catholic, and a peasant.”58 
 The key turning point for Irish nationalist movements was the failed Easter Rising of 
1916. All the leaders of the rebellion were executed by British forces except for Eamon 
DeValera, the future President of the Republic of Ireland, who was spared due to his status as 
an American citizen. There were more movements for Home Rule, essentially the fullest 
extent of devolution, but eventually in 1921, after a series of battles and negotiations, Ireland 
was granted independence, save for six counties—the territory of the UK now known as 
“Northern Ireland.” 
 Sinn Féin is a nationalist political party founded in 1905. It developed a military 
wing, the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Although there are dozens of nationalist political 
parties and militias in the history of Ireland (and subsequently Northern Ireland), what is 
unique about this particular party is that it is a major party in both Ireland and Northern 
Ireland. Sinn Féin has the ultimate goal of reunifying the Northern counties with the 
Republic, and the IRA was responsible for some of the violence in Northern Ireland from the 
1970s onward, a period known as “the Troubles.” The IRA was not the only terrorist group 
fighting in Northern Ireland. However, they were (and still are) one of the only groups with a 
clear political agenda, this being opposition to British rule and the unification Ireland. The 
myriad Unionist groups terrorizing Catholic neighborhoods and carrying out their own 
executions have in common their opposition to being annexed by the Republic. However, 
they have varying political goals regarding the strength of ties with the Union.  
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 There is a long history of Irish nationalists trying to advocate for dominion status or 
Home Rule, and it has been a convenient narrative to explain it as impoverished Catholics vs 
wealthy “Anglo-Irish” Protestants. However, this narrative ignores more than just the 
seminal nationalist uprising, led by Wolfe Tone. Among the notable contradictions to this 
narrative are Erskine Childers, who was an English civil servant and Irish republican59; 
Countess Markievicz,60 who was born in London and moved to Dublin after marrying a 
Polish Count, became an Irish Republican, fought in the Easter Rising of 1916, and became 
the first elected female politician in the UK as an MP for Sinn Féin; and James Conolly, one 
of the many executed for his role in the Easter Rising61, although a Scot born to Irish 
immigrants, was  residing in Dublin. Another Irish nationalist leader, Charles Stewart 
Parnell, was a Protestant, Cambridge-educated MP that led the political fight for Irish Home 
Rule.62  In fact, Catholics were among the last to join the Irish Republican movement.  
 The historic Good Friday Agreement under the Blair administration effectively 
stopped the sectarian violence in Northern Ireland by allowing free movement between 
Ireland and the North, allowing those born in Northern Ireland the option of becoming Irish 
citizens, and permitting the Northern Irish to hold a referendum on joining Ireland that would 
be recognized by both countries.63 However, this has not ended the violence. There are still 
deep scars and segregated neighborhoods, and to an outside observer this nationalist conflict 
is rooted in religious differences. For example, the Catholic neighborhoods will have 
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Palestinian flags raised, and one can see Israeli flags in the windows of the houses of 
Protestant families.64 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the troubles in Northern Ireland 
both have a religious element, but the flags are raised for nationalist causes. The Protestants 
in Northern Ireland identify with the Israeli cause as a people destined and entitled to live in 
a land granted to them by God. The Catholics side with the Palestinians, both feeling that 
they are an indigenous population subjugated by colonial occupiers. The divisions between 
Catholics and Protestants are ultimately not the root cause of the violent nationalism that we 
have witnessed in Northern Ireland, as we have not seen the same “troubles” in cities and 
counties with large Protestant populations in the Republic.  
d. Scotland 
 Even though Scotland voted to join England and dissolve its parliament in the Act of 
Union in 1707, Scotland has always retained a modicum of sovereignty. Whereas Cornwall 
and Wales were both incorporated into England by 1543, Scotland joined crowns with 
England as a sovereign nation in 1603, and when  they “joined” parliaments in 1707, 
Scotland still remained a distinct territory, separate from England. In addition to this 
somewhat ceremonial sovereignty, Scotland has kept a separate Church, a separate 
educational system, a separate legal system, and even separate currency notes. It is this 
distinctive civic sovereignty that has created a national identity apart from the romanticized 
ethnocentric nationalism of other independence campaigns.   
 Queen Elizabeth I had no children to inherit the throne, and so she named her 
nephew, James VI, as her rightful heir. James VI of Scotland became James I of England, 
and ruled over both kingdoms from London. A century later, in 1707, the Scottish Parliament 
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was dissolved and Scotland was allowed to send less than a hundred Members of Parliament 
(MPs) to Westminster. However, the creation of this union was by no means popular or 
peacefully accepted. There were at least ninety-six petitions submitted to the Scottish 
Parliament to protest the terms of the proposed Union. There were violent protests and troops 
were sent in with orders “to shoot if necessary.”65 
 Animosity towards London, the Crown, and Parliament brewed throughout Scotland. 
According to Colley, novelist Daniel Defoe feared facing anti-English backlash and often 
posed as a Frenchman when traveling throughout Scotland.66 In reality, Defoe was a well-
know spy for the Crown and architect of the Act of Union in 1707,67 and he certainly would 
have been a walking target for that reason, thus needing the French alias.  
 The Jacobites are perhaps the most famous of the Scottish nationalist movements, and 
launched rebellions in 1715 and 1745. The Jacobites were a group favoring the reinstatement 
of the Stuart dynasty as rightful heirs to the Kingdom of Scotland, and therefore, the 
Kingdom of Great Britain. Despite the common portrayal of Jacobites as Highlanders68 
rebelling against an English king, there were actually “English Jacobites” in Wales and 
Cornwall also plotting to rebel and reinstate James II. However, after losing some key battles 
in Scotland in 1720, James II fled back to France and the Jacobites that were not killed went 
underground. 
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  In 1745, another rebellion was planned, culminating in the tragic Battle of Culloden. 
The battle is reported to have lasted only half an hour, with over 2,000 Scots dead and 1,000 
taken prisoner. After a series of public executions, retaliatory laws in 1746 and 1747 were 
introduced in Scotland, banning tartan and other “highland dress,” weapons, public meeting 
places, and bagpipes.  
 As was the case in Wales, Cornwall, and Ireland, nationalists movements in Scotland 
did not end after an Act of Union and quashed rebellion. During a labour strike in Glasgow in 
1919, protestors clashed with police, and fearing “revolution,” the UK government locked 
Scottish soldiers in their barracks and sent in English troops and tanks.69 
 Scotland has consistently been to the political left of England, but with its 59 seats in 
Westminster compared to England’s 535 seats, the Scots are perpetually doomed to be ruled 
by a government they did not vote for. This was particularly damaging in the 1970s and 
1980s. The Poll Tax, protested all across the UK, was introduced into Scotland one year prior 
to its implementation in England and Wales. There has been speculation that Thatcher used 
Scotland as a “guinea pig” because the loss of Scottish voters, should the Poll Tax become a 
failure, would be rather inconsequential to the Conservative party.70 
 Although the UK had had nuclear submarines in Scotland since 1968, they were 
extremely unpopular among the Scottish people.71 Thatcher’s decision to replace the original 
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submarines with Trident missiles appeared to be another blatant disregard for the opinions of 
the Scottish people—over 80% of Scots oppose Trident72. In fact, the decision to place 
potentially unstable nuclear weapons in Scotland remains rather controversial. In the 1960s, 
when the UK and US governments were looking for appropriate harbors to host Trident, two 
were selected: Devonport and Faslane. Devonport was eliminated as a choice due to its 
“proximity to built-up locations  and “increased public sensitivity to risk.”73 Devonport has a 
population of 6,34474,  whereas Faslane is located a mere 25 miles from Glasgow—
Scotland’s largest city with a total population of 600,000. The unwelcome presence of 
nuclear missiles in Scottish waters added to the Scottish narrative that Scotland was being 
targeted as a “guinea pig” by those in Westminster, a narrative to be fortified during the 
Thatcher administration in the 1980s.75 
 In 1999, Scotland finally regained a sovereign parliament as a result of the 
Devolution Referendum in 1997.  The Parliament has 129 seats and was granted powers to 
legislate on matters such as tourism, education, health, agriculture, and justice. “Reserved 
matters” cannot be legislated by the Scottish Parliament. These include  abortion, 
broadcasting policy, civil service, common markets for UK goods and services, constitution, 
electricity, coal, oil, gas, nuclear energy, defense and national security, drug policy, 
employment, foreign policy and relations with Europe, most aspects of transport safety and 
regulation, National Lottery, protection of borders, social security and stability of UK's 
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fiscal, economic and monetary system. The discrepancy between the amount of powers 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament versus the powers still held by Westminster was one of 
the many rallying cries for an independent Scotland.  
 Of special interest is the referendum for Scottish independence in 2014. This 
referendum would not have been possible, or even considered, if the Scottish National Party 
had not won the 2007 Scottish general election.  
 The Scottish National Party (SNP) was founded in 1934, the result of a merger 
between the National Party of Scotland and the Scottish Party. A social-democratic party, it 
has consistently advocated the case for Scottish home-rule. The SNP won its first 
parliamentary seat in 1945 in a by-election, and lost it a mere few months later, not to secure 
another seat until 1967. The SNP has had continuous representation in Westminster since 
1967, but until 2015 had never held more than eleven seats at a time.   
 With the creation of the Scottish Parliament, the SNP gained a considerable amount 
of authority as the second largest party in Scotland. In 2007, it won the majority of seats by 
one seat (47 seats, compared to the Labour Party’s 46 seats), and formed a minority 
government. In 2011, the SNP won a clear majority and with the majority government 
formed, they were finally able to introduce a mandate to hold the referendum.76 The Scottish 
Independence Referendum Act 2013 passed in the Scottish Parliament in June of that year, 
and the campaign for the referendum officially launched May 30, 2014.  
 The campaign was divided into two groups: the Yes campaign was in favor of 
independence and the No campaign, or Better Together, was in favor of Scotland staying in 
                                                
76 It should be noted that the elections for the Scottish Parliament were designed to avoid a majority 
government by having both single-member district seats and representational seats. This makes the  
SNP victory in 2011 all the more remarkable.  
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the United Kingdom. The Yes campaign was a conglomeration of many different political 
and ethnic groups. There existed groups such as “English Scots for Yes”— English people 
that moved to Scotland and were pro-independence—, “Asian Scots for Yes,” and “Labour 
for Yes.”  The Labour Party itself officially sided with the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat Parties in the No campaign.  
 In June 2013, it came to light that the No Campaign had secretly dubbed its campaign 
“Project Fear.”77 The No campaign warned Scottish voters of unintended consequences 
should they vote for yes: the UK would veto an independent Scotland’s bid for EU 
membership, Scotland would not be allowed to use the pound sterling (GBP), and even 
floated the rather bizarre threat that an independent Scotland would not be able to access 
episodes of the much-loved BBC television series, Doctor Who.78 In a televised debate 
between Nicola Sturgeon, the then-deputy leader of the SNP and Johann Lamont, the leader 
of the Scottish Labour Party (and therefore a key leader in the No Campaign), a flustered 
Lamont opined “We’re not genetically programmed in Scotland to make political 
decisions.”79  
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Interestingly, in the year leading up to the referendum, a new actor, Peter Capaldi, was chosen to play 
the title character of “Doctor Who.” Although Capaldi was not the first Scottish actor to play the 
Doctor, he was the first allowed to use his Scottish accent while playing the character. Many saw this 
as a concession to Scots that felt unrepresented by the BBC in an attempt to sway votes.  
79 STV Scotland Tonight. “'We're not genetically programmed in Scotland to make political decisions’ 
says Johann Lamont.” Youtube. Uploaded by Gerscowin. 25 February 2014.  
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 Despite having the advantage of the BBC and a virtually unlimited budget,80 these 
blunders cost the No campaign momentum in the polls. The Yes campaign had around 52% 
support81, and with only a month left before the vote, the No campaign kicked into high gear.  
 Prime Minister David Cameron, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, and Leader of 
the Opposition Ed Miliband published “The Vow” in the Daily Record. The Vow was a 
promise to the Scottish people that if they were to vote no in the referendum, Scotland would 
be rewarded with more autonomy. Assuming that three posh English politicians’ promises 
would not sway a majority of Scottish voters, former Prime Minister Gordon Brown, a Scot, 
was brought out from retirement to promise Scots further devolution, and warn them of the 
stark consequences attendant to independence.82 
 The true victory in the Scottish Referendum was the historic voter turnout—84.6% of 
voters went to cast a ballot. The No campaign won with just 55% of the vote. With the 
population virtually split in half over the issue of independence, it became clear that the vote 
was just the beginning of a new era in Scottish politics.  
 Following the vote, there were accusations and investigations into voter fraud83, 
demand for international committees to investigate after suspicious news footage of ballot 
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counters84,  and a personal admission by the Scottish Conservative Party leader that votes 
were counted ahead of time to predict the outcome of the vote85 which led to a police 
investigation. Unionists violently attacked Yes supporters in Glasgow’s George Square86, and 
the offices of the Sunday Herald, the only newspaper to support Scottish Independence, were 
set ablaze.87 
 As noted previously, Scotland has traditionally been the territory of the Labour Party. 
The 2007 and 2011 SNP victories in the Scottish Parliament were major upsets to the status 
quo, but nothing compares to what has been dubbed the “tsunami” of 2015. Former Labour 
Home Secretary David Blunkett was first to describe the unprecedented and unanticipated 
rise of the SNP after the referendum as a “tsunami,” and the term has quickly taken off.88  
 What could have happened during the UK General Election in May 2015 that would 
prompt politicians and scholars to compare the events to an enormous natural disaster? The 
simple answer is that the Labour Party lost Scotland.89 Even the Shadow Foreign Secretary, 
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Douglas Alexander (Labour), who had held his seat in Westminster for nearly twenty years, 
lost his seat in a landslide to 20-year-old university student, Mhairi Black of the SNP.90 
 Prior to the referendum, Labour held 46 Westminster seats, the Liberal Democrats 
held 11 seats, the SNP held 6 seats, and unsurprisingly, the Conservatives had but one seat in 
Scotland. On May 7, 2015 the SNP won 56 seats, leaving the three other parties each with 
one token seat. In less than a decade, the SNP went from a regional fringe party to the third 
largest political party in the UK. What makes this sudden rise of the SNP so remarkable is 
that just nine months previously, they had lost the independence referendum and their long 
time and beloved leader, Alex Salmond, had as a consequence stepped down. Such a failure 
would certainly be expected to lower morale and begin the death spiral or at the very least the 
marginalization of the party—that is, if we view the referendum as a failed attempt at 
independence. In reality, the very fact that there was a referendum played out as a success for 
the SNP because this allowed the notion of Scottish independence to become a topic of 
mainstream conversation, rather than an idea dismissed as backwards and pointless. 
Worldwide attention was tuned into Scotland and how the Scots would vote and participation 
hit an all time high. With so many eyes watching, the referendum emerged as a sort-of “trial 
run” to see if Scotland should hold another referendum.  
 With such momentum in the referendum campaign, there became visible a “fault 
line” between the Scots and the rest of the UK. The referendum should be viewed as an 
awakening which ultimately mobilized the Scottish people and created a politically active 
society. This is because what happened during the referendum, as important and historic as it 
was, pales in comparison to what happened after.  
                                                
90 “General election: Labour’s Douglas Alexander loses out to SNP.” Financial Times (London). 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/024af5f2-f51c-11e4-8a42-00144feab7de.html#axzz43HKlrdJh 
 37 
 In Scotland, Alex Salmond stepped down as the First Minister and leader of the SNP, 
and the SNP deputy leader, Nicola Sturgeon, stepped up to the plate as leader of the SNP and 
the first female First Minister of Scotland.91 Par for the course, but the electorate eligible to 
vote Sturgeon in as leader of the SNP expanded exponentially. Within four days after the 
referendum, the SNP experienced a 66% rise in membership.92 On the day of the vote, SNP 
membership was totaled to be 25,642. By the end of the first week after the referendum, 
membership had trebled. By April 2015, a month before the UK general election, the 
membership was calculated to be around 105,000. Just for comparison’s sake—the 
Conservative Party, the current government of the UK, has a membership of 149,000 
members spread out across the entire UK. The SNP now has an estimated 110,000 
members—concentrated in Scotland.93  
 Westminster’s actions during the month after the referendum are of interest. Despite 
the Vow, William Hague, the Commons Leader, was quoted saying that granting Scotland 
more powers as a result of a No vote was “not government policy.”94 Although David 
Cameron set up the Smith Commission to propose and create new powers for Scotland after 
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the vote, the Scotland Bill that would deliver these powers passed in the House of Commons 
two years later.95 The additional powers devolved to the Scottish Government via this bill are 
still limited. However, what passed with staggering efficiency and speed, was the English 
Votes for English Laws—otherwise known as EVEL.96 Scottish MPs can now be blocked 
from voting on bills that are considered to be “English Only” or “English and Welsh Only.” 
However, all MPs (including the 535 English MPs) can vote on Scottish matters that have not 
been devolved to Holyrood. Rather than granting new powers for Scotland, Westminster 
further diminished the power and status of Scotland in the UK.  
e. England and Britain 
 As the majority nation and cultural hegemon in the UK, England and her nationalist 
movements have been overlooked or ignored by history and conflated with “Britishness.” 
English culture, ethnicity, language, and customs have long been reappropriated as British, as 
have any English nationalist movements. More often than not, the English will identify as 
British before acknowledging their English heritage, in contrast to the Scots.97 
 This lack of distinct identity perhaps stems from centuries of attempting to cultivate a 
pan-Britannic cultural identity in the UK. However, it seems that the only ethnic group 
convinced of the British identity was the English. For example, in popular culture, the posh 
southern English accent is synonymous with what is referred to as a British accent, and 
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“England” has been used interchangeably with “Britain” even in a significant amount of 
political texts up until this century. In “The English and The British,” Bernard Crick 
expressed his frustration at the lack of distinction between English and British. “The sense of 
identity of the English is almost as difficult to specify as the name of the state…the most 
elusive thing is Englishness itself.”98 The lack of English national identity leads Crick to 
chastise his fellow nationals: “We English must come to terms with ourselves…There is need 
to shed much dead wood and, above all, not to try and infuse everything that is English into 
the common property of British.”99 
 As an example of the English trying to distance themselves from their ethnic and 
national identity, St George’s Day—England’s national Saint’s day, was not celebrated in 
Bristol, an English city, in 2016 because the city was deemed by council officials to be “too 
multicultural.”100 By not allowing official events that could include all ethnic groups in a 
celebration of a national hero, the council effectively signed off national symbols to far-right 
groups, and aggravated moderates who feel that their identity is being edged out. For the sake 
of political correctness, national identity has become a symbol of ethnic chauvinism. 
 The process towards a more federal union with regional autonomy and devolved 
sovereignty for the Celtic minorities, rather than having the anticipated mollifying of 
separatists, had the unanticipated  and unintended effect of creating a new “minority” 
nationalist—the Englishman. Recent polls conducted by the Institute for Public Policy 
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Research and the Future of England Survey suggest that the culprit is Scottish Devolution. 
That is to say, the legitimizing of nationalist groups and minority agendas in the UK has 
perhaps shattered the illusion that there was one Britain. By creating an “other,” and by 
forming distinct regional and national governments, there was a perceived need by the 
English to defend what was considered by the Celtic minorities to be the aggressor state, the 
conqueror. According to these surveys, the rise of the left in Scotland via the SNP in a 
devolved government created a vacuum that allowed the rise of the English new right. 
 The loss of English nationalism came with the creation of British patriotism, as 
England morphed into the British Empire. The English created a new civic nationality, 
British, to replace the ethnic nationality of English, so as to absorb each conquered nation 
under one flag. However, the decline of the British empire and then the emerging autonomy 
of those nations within the UK left England alone without a nationalism to match her 
country.  
 Novelist Daniel Defoe criticized the notion of an English identity, contributing a 
satirical poem entitled, “The True-Born Englishman.” 
   That het'rogeneous thing, an Englishman: 
   In eager rapes, and furious lust begot 
   Betwixt a painted Britain and a Scot. 
   … 
   From whence a mongrel half-bred race there came, 
   With neither name, nor nation, speech nor fame.101 
                                                
101 Defoe, Daniel, and P.N Furbank. The True-born Englishman and Other Writings. London: 
Penguin, 1997. Print. 
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The scathing verse was written with the intention of defending the “foreign king,” William of 
Orange, against English xenophobes. Yet, Defoe tapped deep into the English psyche, 
suggesting that there was no Englishmen for England—that they were a people without a 
nation, despite having a country and state. 
 Even though some English nationalist groups will have “United Kingdom” or 
“Britain” in their name,102 this is a false flag. These groups are based and operate in England 
exclusively and their manifestos and websites explicitly state that they represent the English 
people and England’s national interests, thus making them English nationalist groups, not 
British nationalists. Although devolution has given voice to the nationalists from the minority 
Celtic nations and has even allowed for the city of London to have a degree of autonomy,103 
the rest of England was ignored, and thus the rise of far-right groups such as UKIP and the 
BNP, as well as the success of the Brexit vote in England, are simply reactionary English 
nationalist movements. However, the vast majority of English nationalist groups were 
established during or just after the Thatcher administration, which obviates Scottish 
devolution as the immediate culprit, and suggests that this surge of English nationalists can 
be traced back to Thatcherism. 
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Chapter III: The Thatcher Administration 
 Margaret Thatcher is certainly one of the more memorable Prime Ministers of the 
United Kingdom. She was the first female leader of the Conservative Party in 1975, by 1979 
she became the United Kingdom’s first female Prime Minister,104 and she was the first Prime 
Minister in over 160 years to win a third consecutive term in 1987.105 However, it was her 
economic ideals—which would become known as “Thatcherism”— and her attitude towards 
nationalist groups and minority nationalism that has also secured her a place as the most 
controversial political figure in modern British history. This chapter will first illuminate the 
origins of Thatcherism and Thatcher’s rise to power. The second part of this chapter will 
discuss her agenda and policies during her tenure, and assess the economic and social effects 
of her administration’s policies in Scotland.  
a. Thatcher’s Rise Amidst “Discontent” 
 The UK post-WWII was essentially a welfare state with benefits such as the National 
Health Service (NHS), free compulsory secondary education, and a planned economy. How 
could Thatcher’s free-market and neoliberal economic reforms win over a population that 
had grown accustomed to the Welfare State?  
 The answer lies with the Labour administration preceding Thatcher. There were two 
elections in 1974, the first resulting in a “hung parliament,” and the second securing the 
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Labour Party a majority of three seats.106 To much surprise, Prime Minster Harold Wilson 
resigned in 1976, and James Callaghan, the leader of the Labour Party, was appointed Prime 
Minster.107   
 Callaghan inherited a myriad of problems, ranging from the Troubles, which had 
essentially developed into a Civil War in Northern Ireland, to calls for Devolution coming 
from Wales and Scotland. In addition, there were growing demands from powerful workers’ 
unions, this ultimately bringing down Labour for the next eighteen years.  
 The “Winter of Discontent” refers to the public sector union strikes during the winter 
of 1978-1979.108 The British newspaper The Sun was first to use this famous Shakespearean 
phrase109 to refer to the labor strikes of that winter as hospital workers, garbage collectors, 
grave diggers, and other public sector workers went on strike simultaneously. The UK came 
to a standstill as garbage piled up on the streets and schools were forced to close as there 
were no caretakers or meals staff. The apparent dysfunction allowed Thatcher to push the 
Conservative agenda as a viable alternative to the Labour government with slogans such as 
“Labour isn’t Working,” and allowing her the ability to “portray the Tories as the party of 
law and order, offering Britain a new start after a prolonged period of chaos amounting 
almost to anarchy.”110 
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 Therefore, it was not so much that Thatcher’s policies appealed to the British 
electorate, but that there was no other ready alternative to the debilitated Labour 
administration. Just as Thatcher secured her election to lead the Conservative Party by being 
the only available contender against former Prime Minister Edward Heath, so was she 
ushered in as Prime Minister more or less by default simply because there was no other 
alternative in the eyes of British voters. Although Thatcher had laid out her vision for a new 
Britain, free from government regulation and unnecessary public spending, “many Tory MPs 
and commentators doubted she would act on her rhetoric.”111 
b. Ideology and Agenda 
 Thatcher was, in her own words, a “conviction politician,” not one for consensus.112 
Thatcher was heavily influenced by the works of Milton Friedman and F. A. Hayek, and thus 
rejected the Keynesian model of economics that Britain had subscribed to since the Second 
World War. Her “neo-liberal” vision was firm, believing that big government was at the root 
of Britain’s economic crises, and that government spending should be brought down to a 
minimum. Thatcher viewed economics as a field to be articulated simply and executed 
boldly. Regarding issues of the day such as rising inflation, she said, “It does not require A-
level economics, or artificial labels like monetarism, to understand,” arguing that her 
administration “will bring the growth of the money supply down.”113  
 Her goals entering office in 1979 were to bring down inflation by limiting the money 
supply, abolish exchange controls thus “exposing the British economy to a global market,”114 
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remove the state from industry by means of privatization, restrain government borrowing and 
spending, and limit the power and influence of trade unions. Although government spending 
went up during her tenure, reaching at one point a high of 48% of GDP, Thatcher eventually 
brought taxation down ten percentage points by 1990 and decreased the national debt by 
another ten percentage points by her eleventh year in office.115  
 Thatcher’s zeal for free-market economics allowed for more than 50 enterprises to be 
privatized during her three terms. Most notably, she privatized British Petroleum, British 
Shipbuilders, British Gas, Rolls-Royce, Jaguar, Associated British Ports, British Steel, 
Water, and Electricity. Although this privatization boom raised 50 billion pounds116 (GBP) 
for the Exchequer (Britain’s equivalent to the Treasury), the amount of workers employed in 
manufacturing fell 42%, and overall unemployment increased from 5.3% to 11.9% during 
her time in office.117 According to Anthony Seldon and Daniel Collings, authors of Britain 
Under Thatcher, this rise was “a result of the pursuit of economic dogma,” and accordingly, 
“unemployment was allowed to rise needlessly…and an ‘underclass’ grew greatly in size. 
The so-called ‘Thatcher economic miracle,’” they argue, “was a myth, the creation of the 
government propaganda machine.”118 
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 Thatcher viewed wealth and a healthy economy as products of individual effort and 
she famously proclaimed “There is no such thing as society!”. Ultimately, it was the 
individual that was responsible for his or her own welfare; social reform was not part of the 
duties of government. This worldview was laid out before the General Congress of the 
Church of Scotland on the Mound in Edinburgh in 1988, when she argued that the creation of 
wealth was not inherently immoral, and that the Church should teach individual 
responsibility, quoting St John “If a man will not work, then he shall not eat.”119 This speech 
has come to be known as “the Sermon on the Mound,” —a tongue in cheek title referencing 
the Bible’s “Sermon on the Mount” —referring to the manner in which she spoke, appearing 
to lecture the Scottish clergymen on charity. As this was pre-devolution, “the Church of 
Scotland's General Assembly was, at that time, the closest thing Scotland had to a national 
political assembly,” and Thatcher appeared to not have “realized the political significance of 
the gathering.”120   
 Three years in particular stand out as particularly definitive during Thatcher’s tenure: 
1981, 1984, and 1989. These are the years when the Thatcher administration faced its 
greatest resistance from voters through civil disobedience and violent protest.  
 The Irish Republican Army prisoners in HM Prison Maze (located in County Down, 
Northern Ireland) began a hunger strike in May 1981 to protest their status as criminals and 
to secure acknowledgment that they were indeed political prisoners. Thatcher refused any 
concessions, saying “Crime is crime is crime. It is not political.” She was “resolute in her 
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attitude that the strikers were common criminals.”121 Ten Irish nationalists had died of 
starvation by the time the strike was called off in October. Although she considered this to be 
a “significant defeat for the IRA,” it ultimately created more support for Sinn Fein. The 
leader of the hunger strike, Bobby Sands, was elected as a Member of Parliament during this 
strike but died before taking his seat in the House of Commons. At news of Sands’ death, 
violent protests erupted in Northern Ireland, killing 68 people, and around 100,000 people 
attended his funeral.   
 Simultaneously, the civil servants unions demanded a 15% pay raise, and Thatcher’s 
government maintained that only 7% was possible. The strike that began in March 1981 
lasted for 21 weeks before a compromise of a 7.5% pay raise was reached. Apparently, the 
unions were willing to take the 7.5% as early as June, but Thatcher balked at any concession 
and the extra seven weeks of strike cost the taxpayers an additional 500 million pounds. The 
total cost of the strike was estimated at around one billion pounds,122 as the delayed tax 
collection forced the government to borrow money. 
 In that same year, there were violent riots in London and Liverpool over the economy 
and unemployment, but “Mrs Thatcher vehemently denied such a connection, refusing to 
believe that unemployment was the main cause of the rioting and instead took steps to ensure 
the police were given all the support they needed…Through these turbulent months of 1981, 
economic policy was to remain unchanged.”123 
 The Miners’ Strike of 1984 is reminiscent of the previous strikes in the 1970s against 
Edward Heath, and even as far back as the Welsh miners’ strikes of the 1920s. The 
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announced closure of the coal pits in Northern England, South Wales, and Scotland would 
eventually lead to at least 20,000 lost jobs. The National Union of Miners, lead by Arthur 
Scargill, called for a national strike in March 1984. Thatcher demonized the striking miners, 
calling them “the enemy within.”124 Overall, the year-long strike resulted in three deaths, 200 
arrests, 20,000 injuries from the picket line, most notably the ‘Battle of Orgreave,’ where 
5,000 picketers went head to head with 5,000 riot police, and the strike ultimately cost the 
British taxpayer two billion pounds.125 Although costly, the hard line Thatcher held 
ultimately brought down the political power of trade unions in the UK.  
 The Community Charge, popularly referred to as the Poll Tax, was introduced into 
Scotland in April 1989, a year prior to its implementation elsewhere in the UK. It was a flat-
rate tax designed to serve as a funding source for local government, replacing local rates 
(property taxes) levied against homeowners. The idea for the Poll Tax was actually put 
forward by Scottish Conservatives in an attempt to lessen the burden on Conservative 
Scottish homeowners.126 While it may have lessened the burden for wealthy Tory 
landowners, the problem with this flat tax was that it was applied to everyone, irrespective of 
their ability to pay. The Community Charge lowered the rates for wealthy landowners, but 
raised the rates for the average Scot. Given that Thatcher’s previous policies such as the 
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privatization or closure of state industries had left one in six Scots unemployed, this was 
inevitably going to be a public relations disaster.  
 Thatcher’s neo-liberal policies particularly devastated Scotland as it had little other 
industry at the time. There was little to no effort to lessen the strain of unemployment and 
new utility costs, as this would entail government intervention. However, the Conservatives 
could have survived this economic downturn in Scotland had it not been for Thatcher’s 
perceived disdain for the Scots themselves. Her “Sermon on the Mound” speech was seen as 
condescending, along with her phrases such as “you in Scotland,” indicating that it was an 
alien country.127 She had repealed the Scotland Act of 1978 that was intended to provide 
Scotland with a small assembly, and had referred to the published ‘Claim of Right’ for a 
Scottish Assembly in 1988 as “mumbo jumbo.” While actively campaigning against 
devolution of any sort, she is also quoted as telling the Scottish Tory Chairman, Michael 
Ancram, “Michael, I am an English nationalist and never you forget it.”128  
 Thatcher had never “won” Scotland in an election, and so the introduction of the Poll 
Tax in Scotland a year prior to its implementation in England and Wales was a policy that 
many Scottish felt, and still feel, was a deliberate punishment for their left-leaning politics.129 
Despite the popular mythology surrounding it, the Poll Tax and its early release in Scotland 
was not the brainchild of a vengeful Thatcher, but the product of misplaced good intentions 
on the part of her Scottish counterparts in the Conservative party. The Poll Tax was 
established as a flat-rate tax to replace the rising local property taxes. The taxes in Scotland 
were set to be raised in 1989, and so Scottish Conservatives lobbied to have the Poll Tax 
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introduced into Scotland before the rates were to be raised, thus saving their constituents 
from paying more unnecessarily. It was a misguided attempt to earn the support of 
constituents on the part of the Scottish Conservatives, apparently ignorant of the historical 
unpopularity of flat-rate taxes in Britain, and unaware of the resentment towards any policy 
Thatcher’s government put forward after inflation, unemployment, and debt continued to 
rise. 
 Perhaps there is more to the “guinea pig” narrative, after all, in a memo written by 
policy advisor Oliver Letwin, the argument for introducing the tax a year early in Scotland 
was that they could find "undetected gremlins lurking in the proposals” before implementing 
the tax in England or Wales. Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote a memo in 
response, calling the move “politically catastrophic” and “unworkable.”130 
 Ultimately, the tax had to be abandoned. Less than half of Scots actually paid the tax, 
and there were large demonstrations and protests throughout Scotland. A year later in 1990, 
the Poll Tax incited the most serious riots that London had seen in a century leaving 113 
injured and 300 arrested.131 
 
 
c. Thatcher’s Legacy in Scotland 
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 The economic policies and perceived attitude of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
created a collective sense of victimization132 in Scotland. During her first two years in power, 
one in six Scots became unemployed and Scotland lost 20% of its workforce. The current 
Scottish minister for health has claimed that it was Thatcher’s policies of shutting down 
entire industries without offering new avenues of employment that led to a 60% rise in deaths 
of Scottish working age men, due to alcoholism and suicide.133 Whether the direct causation 
can be proved or not, the perception of the catastrophic effects of Thatcherism in Scotland 
looms large and unforgiving in the Scottish collective memory.  
  Thatcher’s policies inadvertently created a hostile mentality between the Scots and 
English.  The Poll Tax helped cement her status as the most reviled politician in Scotland. 
Her reputation was cemented as “anti-Scottish, uncaring, and a divisive leader who looked 
after the interests of the rich rather than the population as a whole.”134 A friend of both 
Margaret and Denis Thatcher defended Mrs Thatcher, saying that the Scots disliked her 
premiership because “the Scots are a male chauvinist race, and not any longer particularly 
intelligent, because most of the best people have left Scotland.”135 This, of course, did her no 
favors. A year after the 1987 election, a poll showed that three-quarter of Scots thought that 
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she ‘treated the Scots as second-class citizens,’ and four out of five polled disliked Thatcher 
as Prime Minister.136 
 The communal hatred towards Thatcher in Scotland was fueled by the sentiment that 
“she was a bossy English woman…with the cut-glass voice and an apparently patronising 
manner”137 Her unapologetic Englishness while castigating the “culture of dependency”138 in 
Scotland fostered an “us versus them” sentiment between Scots and English. Conservative 
Michael Gove once said that by 1988, “You could only be a good Scot if you were pro-
Parliament and anti-Thatcher; the three became one.”139 The current first minister for 
Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, said “Thatcher was the motivation of my entire political career. I 
hated everything she stood for.”140 The economic and social crisis and sense of national 
community in Scotland during and after the Thatcher administration made Scottish 
Devolution seem inevitable. Margaret Thatcher was, indeed, “the greatest of all Scottish 
Nationalists”141 and “the handmaiden for the return of Scottish Democracy.”142  
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 When Westminster reconvened after Thatcher’s death in 2013, Angus Robertson, an 
SNP MP, stood up to offer his brief condolences and said, “We will never forget, we will 
never forgive the poll tax being imposed on Scots a year before the rest of the UK. No 
country should have such policies imposed on it when they were rejected at the ballot box. 
The existence of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh National Assembly follows this 
experience. Margaret Thatcher will be remembered for a long time in Scotland and Wales. 
She helped remind us that we have a national consensus that values society, values solidarity 
and values community. For that at least, we can be grateful.”143 Her impact on Scottish 
political life cannot be overestimated. Her death was nearly three decades after her 
premiership, and while there was an impressive state-funded funeral in London, there were 
impromptu parades and street parties in Glasgow, complete with effigies, champagne bottles, 
and signs proclaiming, “The bitch is dead.”144  
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Chapter IV: The Results 
a.   Scotland as a Case Study 
 Scotland is often seen as having a unique national situation among the nations of the 
UK due to its constitutional status.145 Although the circumstances by which it joined the UK 
is peculiar, the nationalist movements in Scotland do not differ so radically from other 
nationalist movements in the UK as commonly perceived. The impression that Scotland has 
had a special place in the history of nationalism in the UK has perhaps helped Scottish 
nationalists achieve their goals before their counterparts in Wales and Cornwall. This cultural 
myth and subsequent successes have granted legitimacy to the Scottish national movement. 
Consequently, there is a great deal more information regarding the Scottish economy and 
Scottish national identity than there is for the other minority nations, which were, and under 
some conditions still are, considered as part of England.146 This, of course, distorts the 
available data for the other nations.  
 Prior to the “Winter of Discontent,” but shortly after Thatcher assumed leadership of 
the Conservatives, Tom Nairn published a collection of essays entitled The Break-Up of 
Britain (1977). The work’s seminal contribution is the distinction he draws between the 
nationalisms of old and “neo-nationalism”147 that was gaining popularity, particularly in 
Scotland. He provided a Marxist critique of Britain as a nation, but also as a multi-national 
state about to crumble in the way that other European states had in the interwar period. 
However, this “neo-nationalism” as Nairn describes as a class-based nationalism, is not final 
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evolution of Scottish nationalism. Nationalism in Scotland did divert from the traditional 
romantic nationalism rooted in ethnocentrism to an economically-based nationalism, but it 
did not emerge as a multi-ethnic, multi-national(!) nationalist movement until the 1990s.  
 Nairn’s critique of the uneven economic development within the UK as divided by 
nation and his prediction of a federalization, if not the complete “break up of Britain,” was 
published soon after the SNP successfully gained seats at Westminster. Although these 
essays were written quite a time ago, the conclusions actually proved prescient decades later. 
Indeed, the spectacular failure of the 1979 Devolution Referendum quelled some of the 
nationalist support, but then the impact of Thatcherism on the Scottish economy 
reinvigorated support for devolution in Scotland and Wales—increasing the odds 
enormously. Michael Mann’s book review on The Break-Up of Britain emphasized that, 
according “to Nairn, Scottish nationalism is not a reaction to capitalist development, it is 
capitalist development.”148 The original impetus for Nairn’s essays, the supposed rise of 
nationalism inside the UK, was the success of the SNP at Westminster in the 1970s. For the 
first time since its inception, the SNP held more than one seat at Westminster—first rising to 
7 seats in February 1974, and then 11 seats in October 1974. This sudden rise would appear 
to show that there was a new nationalist movement in Scotland—that the SNP was becoming 
part of the mainstream. However, in the 1979 election, (two years after Nairn published The 
Break-Up of Britain) the SNP dropped back down to two seats. Until the radical 2015 
election, when the SNP rose to gain 56 of the 59 available seats for Scotland, the party was 
never able to maintain more than 6 seats at Westminster. The rise of nationalism anticipated 
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in the 1970s was a mere “flash in the pan,”149 the result of protest votes against the 
ineffectiveness of the recent Conservative, then Labour governments.  
 The first devolution referendum was also in 1979, and as discussed previously, 
ultimately did not pass, thus making the “break-up of Britain,” seem far less likely. However, 
the new century proves to be more promising for nationalists in Scotland. The SNP has 
maintained leadership in the Scottish Government since 2011, and remains the third largest 
party in the UK despite losing seats in the 2017 election.  
 Nairn’s main premise had been that support for independence increases where 
poverty increases. “The arrival of nationalism in a distinctly modern sense was tied to the 
political baptism of the lower classes…nationalist movements have been invariably populist 
in outlook and sought to induct lower classes into political life.”150 Nairn could not have 
predicted the full extent of the trauma caused by Thatcherism in Scotland during the late 
1980s. Nonetheless he added a “postscript 1981” in subsequent editions, attempting to 
address the effects of Thatcherism as of that year. Despite having an entire chapter entitled 
“Old and New Scottish Nationalism,” nationalism in the UK, particularly in Scotland, had yet 
to become new again until the next century.  
b.   Unemployment and Deprivation 
Unemployment 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, there is a definitive collective memory 
regarding Thatcher and her policies in Scotland. This cannot be overstated. The Scottish 
economy was mainly industrial, with one out of three Scots employed in heavy industry. The 
                                                
149 Devine, p 127.  
150 Nairn, Tom. The Break-Up of Britain. Verso Editions: London. 1981. Print. p 41 
 57 
closures of mines, plants, and factories as a result of Thatcherism would often end up leaving 
three generations of the same family unemployed.151  
 Although there are some strong arguments (mostly made from the other side of the 
border) that these industries were already failing— that Thatcher, in fact, subsidized these 
plants at great expense until the absolute end— collective memory remains strong. As seen in 
Figure 1, the unemployment levels for the UK as a whole skyrocketed. However, it was the 
high levels of unemployment and subsequent social decay in Scotland that are the most 
remembered, and are blamed on Thatcher and the Conservative Party.  
 The rise in unemployment and collective hatred towards Thatcher and all that she 
represented was not unique to Scotland, but the feeling that many Scots have that Thatcher 
specifically targeted Scotland remains strong. Crediting Thatcher with the success of Scottish 
devolution has become the dominant narrative. Indeed, the “new nationalism,” as it is 
referred to, “was promoted by Scotland’s civic and media commentators to give an 
intellectual coherence to the nation’s rejection of Thatcherite values.”152  
 As early as 1984, it was evident that the rise in unemployment was not distributed 
evenly. However, Scotland was not the only minority nation within the UK affected. 
Scotland, Wales, Cornwall, and patches of England were the hardest hit, with unemployment 
levels in Scotland and Wales rising to levels last seen during the Great Depression.153  
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Figure 2. Source: Salt, John. “The Geography of Unemployment in the United Kingdom in the 
1980s.” In: Espace, Populations, Sociétés, 1985-2. Chômage, non-emploi, sous-emploi. p 349. 
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Deprivation 
 Ted Robert Gurr’s seminal essay, Why Men Rebel (1971), uses a sociological and 
psychological approach to explain and predict when societies engage in political violence. At 
the most basic level, mankind are conditioned to “avoid unpleasant stimuli” via creativity or 
destruction, political violence belonging to the latter route. Gurr defines “relative 
deprivation” as an actor’s perception of deprivation as a result of a discrepancy between what 
he labels as “value capabilities” (what is possible to attain) and “value expectations” (what an 
actor believes he or she is entitled to).154 After postulating three psychological assumptions, 
Gurr then provides an outline of three patterns of relative deprivation that have the capability 
to lead to political violence: decremental deprivation, aspirational deprivation, and 
progressive deprivation. Decremental deprivation is when value expectations remain 
constant, but value capability decreases substantially over time. Aspirational deprivation 
occurs when value expectations rise but value capabilities stay at normal levels. Finally, 
progressive deprivation occurs when both value capabilities and value expectations rise 
concurrently, but then the value capabilities take a sudden and rapid downturn. 
 Scotland under Thatcher experienced all three levels of relative deprivation that Gurr 
discussed. Decremental deprivation occurred in some communities, as the local industrial 
plants that employed generations of Scots were shut down and there was no available 
alternative employment.  
                                                
154 Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1970. Print. pp 22-58.  
 60 
 
Figure 3. Source: Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton University Press: Princeton. 1971. 
Print. p 47. 
 
 There was aspirational deprivation in other communities: for example, one of 
Thatcher’s main policies, the right to buy council houses, ended up bankrupting families. 
Those who were renting state-subsidized houses were unable to make the mortgage payments 
set by the neoliberal state. Aspirational deprivation also occurred when oil was discovered in 
the North Sea, and yet Scots remained unemployed and unable to receive the benefits of the 
oil, as revenues were deposited into the Bank of England. The economy across Scotland 
varies, from the agricultural and isolated Highlands to the industrial center of Glasgow.  
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Figure 4. Source: Ibid. p 51. 
 
 Some other communities, such as Edinburgh, witnessed a rise in expectations and 
capabilities with the introduction of neoliberalism, but then capabilities experienced a rapid 
decline, and thus progressive deprivation set in.  
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Figure 5. Source: Ibid. p 53. 
 
 Despite all of this occurring in Scotland, there was no large-scale political violence or 
revolt as Gurr would have predicted. Gurr concludes in 1971 that the stability and lack of 
political violence in the UK is “conventionally credited to the evolution of complex and 
responsive political institutions, supported by the widespread fundamental agreement on the 
procedures if not necessarily the purposes of political activity.”155 Ironically, the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland were already in full swing, having started in 1968. However, the Troubles 
were also a product of a specific set of circumstances unique to the relationship between 
Ireland the UK, and to discredit Gurr as a result of his erroneous conclusions regarding the 
political atmosphere of the UK would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater. He is 
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correct, in that Britain did not experience political violence, but incorrect in his assumption 
that the United Kingdom’s regime type protects the state from political violence.  
 It is perhaps because there was such strife in Northern Ireland that, despite the 
relative deprivation occurring in Scotland, Scots did not resort to political violence. 
Thatcher’s policies of refusing to bow down to nationalist groups and the violence against 
civilians by British troops may have acted as a deterrent to nationalist groups in Scotland that 
would have otherwise gone the traditional route of rebellion.  
 If rebellion could be conceived as political nationalism, then Gurr’s core hypotheses 
are still valid for Scotland. Although Scotland did not resort to political violence, the Scots 
did rebel via the ballot box, and perhaps rebelled more effectively than their counterparts in 
Northern Ireland. The Conservative party was left with only one seat in Scotland, and Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats met the same fate less than two decades later. The Scots rebelled 
by restoring the Scottish Parliament and making their nationalist separatist political party, the 
SNP, the third largest political party in the UK.   
 Although there have been scores of other works regarding nationalism, rebellion, and 
national wealth, the majority of these focus on the ethnic or violent components of intra-state 
conflict. Virtually none of these works address the complexity of national identity in the UK, 
and the few that do use Northern Ireland as a singular token case, mislabeling the Troubles as 
a solely ethnic or religious conflict.  
 One problem with applying ethnic conflict models to the nationalist movements in the 
UK is that these national identities are not based on ethnicity alone. Another is that, as 
discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, the violence in Northern Ireland virtually ended 
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with the Good Friday agreement, and the island of Great Britain has not been witness to 
violent nationalism since the last Jacobite rebellion.  
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin argue in “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 
that states with diverse and antagonistic ethnic and religious groups are no more likely to 
suffer from civil war than other states, which lends credence to the theory that neither 
ethnicity nor religion are the reasons behind nationalist conflict in the UK. However, their 
findings that the factors that best predict civil war—large populations, instability, and 
poverty—do not necessarily correlate to current situation in the UK. The populations of the 
minority nations of the United Kingdom are all relatively small (none reach above six 
million), and despite the rise in unemployment levels during the Thatcher years, on the 
whole, the UK has continuously been one of the wealthiest states in the world.  
 Instability also could not necessarily be applied to the UK, as both the monarchy and 
parliament have been stable and continuous since The Restoration (when the monarchy was 
reinstated after the English Civil War), and the territorial integrity of the UK as a state has 
been unchallenged since Irish independence in 1922. However, if we consider instability in a 
more nuanced light, such as an instablility of trends rather than governments, we may be able 
to apply Fearon and Laitin’s model.  
As discussed briefly in the Introduction chapter, Duverger’s Law suggests stability as 
states that use FPTP voting systems will eventually settle on two major political parties. 
However, after Thatcher’s tenure, this political stability was thrown into turmoil, as the 
Liberal Democrats, which had been established only in 1988, began to win seats at 
Westminster and local councils, and nationalist political parties, such as the SNP and Plaid 
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Cymru, also began to win seats. The two-party stability of Duverger’s Law has not been 
valid in the UK since the end of the Thatcher era.  
 Ultimately, as a former colonizer, the UK has taken the back seat to its former 
colonies as the center of research regarding civil war, rebellion, and nationalist conflict. 
Although the violence is at a minimum in comparison, this does not negate the presence of 
conflict. Further research that would include more subtle indicators of nationalist conflict 
rather than guerilla warfare and ethnic divisions would greatly advance our understanding of 
national identity and intra-state conflict. The UK may not fit into any of the ethnic conflict or 
civil unrest models provided and used by scholars, however, it is very clear that the UK does 
have nationalist conflict and thus there is a need to reevaluate how the field defines 
nationalist conflict.  
 
c.   Nationalism after Thatcher 
 Although the independence referendum of 2014 failed 55% to 45%, it did so by a 
remarkably close margin. A majority of Scots listed the EU membership as one of the main 
reasons for voting No, as there were threats issued by various members of the Cameron 
government claiming that the UK would veto an independent Scotland’s bid for membership. 
Even though the SNP lost seats in the most recent election (although still holding the 
majority of seats for Scotland), today support for Scottish independence is at an all time high. 
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Figure 6. Source: Scottish Social Attitudes. “From IndyRef1 to IndyRef2? The State of Nationalism 
in Scotland.” (2016) 
  
 This rise in support for independence can be attributed to the decremental deprivation 
Scots feel as a result of Brexit. The Scots voted against Brexit in every constituency, and as 
mentioned previously, a majority of Scots voted against independence to ensure that Scotland 
would maintain EU membership. Their expectations remained stable, and yet the capabilities, 
such as all the perceived benefits of being EU citizens, have declined.  
 However, Scottish nationalism did not emerge as a result of Brexit. The 1997 
Devolution referendum, rise of the SNP, and subsequent independence referendum all 
happened before the Brexit referendum of 2016. The Devolution referendum of 1979 may 
have failed on a technicality (see Chapter II), but the lack of turnout could be said to speak 
for itself. Between 1979 and 1997, the Scots experienced Thatcherism, which not only 
invigorated a new sense of nationalism, but propelled nationalists to change tactics. The SNP 
boasts multi-ethnic leadership, and independence groups vary beyond the traditional 
“Braveheart” Highlanders opposed to British rule. Nationalism has not simply become 
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popular, it has become mainstream. The correlation between the collective memory regarding 
Thatcher and the trends in national identity is impossible to ignore.  
 The rise in Scottish identity along with the drop in British identity following the 
Thatcher years lends credence to this narrative, along with a surprising rise in ethnic 
minorities (those that are non-white) identifying as Scottish rather than British. According to 
a 2014 study by the Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity, Who Feels Scottish?, around 94% of 
those born in Scotland identify as Scottish, and about a quarter of those who emigrated to 
Scotland from ethnic minority groups , identify as Scottish over British.  
 
Figure 7. Source: Simpson, Ludi and Andrew Smith. “Who Feels Scottish?: National Identities and 
Ethnicity in Scotland.” Dynamics of Diversity: Evidence From the 2011 Census. Centre on Dynamics 
of Ethnicity, Aug. 2014. Figure 3.  
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Figure 8. Source: Jeffrey, Charlie et al. “Taking England Seriously: The New English Politics.” The 
Future of England Survey 2014. 2014. Figure 6.1.  
  
 In short, the Thatcher era changed nationalism in the UK. The old tactics of rebellion 
and ethnic romanticism of the Jacobites fell by the wayside, giving way to practical 
economic reasoning and recent collective memory of a nation abused. There is significant 
correlation between the rise in unemployment and Thatcherism, the rise in unemployment 
and the rise national identity, and then subsequent rise of the SNP.  
 All nationalist movements will inevitably use the nationalists of the past to garner 
legitimacy and create a sense of nation-hood. The SNP, like all nationalists, use history to 
their advantage in order to paint a picture of a nation held hostage in a Union, destined to be 
ruled by governments that their people did not vote for. However, these nationalist 
movements have changed radically from their predecessors. Thatcherism created a sense of 
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urgency amongst the nationalists, and the method by which these groups used to achieve 
their nationalist goals changed. Cultural revivals and ethnic heritage sites had never been as 
successful as had been hoped for, and there was less reason to expect more success as 
immigration rose. Since 2001, Scotland’s immigrant population has doubled.156 Neo-
liberalism was a blessing in the sense that its effects gave nationalists an opportunity to 
expand and, for lack of a better word, exploit feelings of deprivation. Thatcherism provided 
an opportunity for nationalists to capitalize on collective memory that Thatcher was “anti-
Scottish,” but also created the need for nationalism to embark on a new journey. The new 
nationalism is practical and mainstream, no longer the material of legends and mythology.  
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
 It can be concluded that there is a strong correlation between the advent of 
Thatcherism and the rise in popularity of the nationalist political party in Scotland, the SNP. 
The increase in relative deprivation experienced as a result of the neoliberal economic 
policies pursued by the Thatcher administration during the 1980s coincides with the rise in 
minority national identity and the subsequent surge in popularity of nationalist political party 
membership.   
 However, the rise in popularity of nationalist movements is not a direct effect of 
relative deprivation caused by Thatcherism. The perception of deprivation is not a new 
narrative among minority nations, nor is the enduring sentiment of nationalism a recent 
development in the United Kingdom. The novelty of this situation is that the manifestation 
and operation of minority nationalist movements within the UK changed significantly, from 
cultural revivals and ethnocentric romanticism to the contemporary, pan-ethnic, economic 
“civic” nationalism.  
 It is worthwhile to explore a possible effect of the rise of minority nationalism on 
majority nationalism, that is to say, English nationalism, in the UK.  
 
What about England? 
 There are other ramifications to the effects of Thatcherism on minority nationalist 
movements in the United Kingdom. In particular, there has been an unprecedented rise of 
English nationalism as manifested by the rise in popularity of far-right political parties which 
according to Charlie Jeffrey, et al, in 2014, is the result of Scottish devolution.  
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 When polled, English voters increasingly felt that the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP), a far-right political party, was the only political party that would look out for 
England’s interests.157 The common theme in survey results is that the English feel that they 
get “less than their fair share” and that Scotland gets “more than their fair share.” 
Figure 9. Source: Jeffrey, et al. “Taking England Seriously.” The Future of England Survey 2014. 
2014. Table 21.  
 
                                                
157 Jeffrey, Charlie, et al. “Taking England Seriously: The New English Politics.” The Future of 
England Survey 2014. 2014. 
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 This resentment, if not jealously, towards Scottish devolution in combination with the 
sentiment that English voters are not represented by their government and the belief that 
foreign nations hold influence over that government signal that this new rise of nationalism 
in England is more a result of political insecurity than ethnic chauvinism. This, in fact,  is a 
prime example of Gurr’s “aspirational deprivation.”158 Although the English have not 
actually lost any capabilities, there is a perceived loss as they did not gain what other nations 
had gained—autonomy. Significantly, Charlie Jeffrey et al found that “dissatisfaction and 
Englishness were strongly and positively associated with one another,” in their Future of 
England 2014 survey. England was the original nation of the United Kingdom, and, 
according to T. M. Devine, was a state created in the interests of the wealthy. The majority of 
those in England that did not necessarily benefit economically from this hegemony, such as 
the northern counties of England, and do not feel that they are represented by any 
government.In fact, around 34% of English responded to a 2014 survey that they would 
support English independence.159 
 The issue at hand is that the majority nation of this Union feels under-represented and 
denied self-determination, and the shift towards the right is perhaps in large part a reaction to 
the neo-nationalists in the minority nations. It is not that so many English are far-right 
conservatives—but that there has been no other political party interested in cultivating a 
healthy support of English ethnic identity. According to a study conducted by Michael Skey 
at the University of East London, there is a perceived notion that English cultural activities 
                                                
158 See Figure 3.  
159 Wyn Jones, Richard et al. “England and Its Two Unions: The Anatomy of a Nation and its 
Discontents.” Institute for Public Policy Research. July 2013. p 13. 
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and groups are “ignored or actively suppressed by government officials.”160 Skey and his 
colleagues also found that there is a broad consensus among English voters that there was an 
“infiltration of the government by Scottish elites” that relished in the ability to “undermine 
Englishness.”161 This fear was satirized, if not validated, by television shows such as The 
Thick of It, where there is constant reference to the “Caledonian Mafia” in Whitehall (the 
British Civil Service). 
 
Implications  
 Although the United Kingdom is unique in many aspects, it is not the only multi-
national state, nor is it the only one that utilizes a FPTP voting system. This means that other 
states will be facing the same challenges to the authority of a central government via 
nationalist-separatist movements, if they are not already. As the events unfold in the UK, one 
should look to India to compare cases. Although there are large differences in population 
size, number of minority groups, and overall wealth, the rise of nationalist movements and 
nationalist political parties are a common trend that cannot be dismissed.  
As detailed in this thesis, nationalist conflict is not inherently violent, however, this 
lack of violence does not preclude effectiveness. This has two implications: Firstly, 
nationalist movements need not resort to violence as means to achieve their ends. Secondly, 
political revolution and national turmoil may be well underway before the effects are even 
recognized in a state because the traditional indicators do not apply.  
   
                                                
160 Skey, Michael. “‘Sod them, I’m English’: The Changing of Status of the ‘Majority’ English in 
Post-Devolution Britain.” Ethnicities 12(1), pp 106-125. 2011.  
161 Ibid. 
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Final Thoughts  
 An interesting point about this syncopated rise of nationalism is that as both 
nationalist movements’ popularity appear to be the result of a prevalent perception of relative 
deprivation, each nationalist movement believes the other to be the source of their 
deprivation. Despite being the majority nation and overall cultural hegemon, England 
exhibits traits of a minority nation.  
 The desire for increased autonomy, if not complete sovereignty, has been a common 
theme throughout the history of the nationalist movements in the United Kingdom. But the 
sudden and extreme implementation of neoliberal economic policies during the tenure of 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher fueled old narratives of dispossession and discrimination 
and reaffirmed minority national identity. As minority nations such as Scotland and Wales 
were able to utilize the popular sentiments of deprivation and galvanize collective memory 
towards increasing autonomy, England was deprived the opportunity for self-determination.  
 The United Kingdom appears to be on a trajectory towards federalism, as British 
identity decreases and minority nationalism grows stronger and becomes more effective. In 
the words of the Irish poet and nationalist William B. Yeats, “The centre cannot hold.”162 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
162 This quote is taken from Yeats’ poem, “The Second Coming.” 1919.   
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